Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 3

Article 8

3-1-1996

Liability for Public Hospitals Under the Texas Tort Claims Act
Deborah Margaret Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
Deborah M. Taylor, Liability for Public Hospitals Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, 2 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.
629 (1996).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V2.I3.7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Taylor: Liability for Public Hospitals Under the Texas Tort Claims Act

LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC HOSPITALS
UNDER THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
INTRODUCTION

An overweight, middle-aged patient enters a Texas county hospital
emergency room complaining of chest pains. Yet, because of hospital
overcrowding, and the fact the patient has a medical history of gastric
reflux, the emergency room staff incorrectly assumes her chest pains
are unrelated to a heart attack. The attending nurse determines that
the patient's heart rate and arterial blood pressure are elevated, but
reasons the elevation is explainable because of the woman's age or
gastric reflux pain. As a precautionary measure, the nurse draws a
blood sample to measure myocardial enzyme levels, which if elevated
would indicate damage to the heart muscle. A short time later, while
waiting to see the attending physician, the patient's chest pain subsides and the emergency room physician subsequently finds that her
vital signs have returned to normal. The physician incorrectly determines her symptoms are caused by the gastric reflux. Moreover, without waiting for the results of the blood test, the physician sends her
home with medication for gastric reflux and instructs her to return if
her pain resumes. Consequently, the patient is dismissed from the
hospital and dies two hours later from a massive heart attack. Notably, the attending physician never ordered an electrocardiogram
("EKG") because hospital administrators had determined a diagnosis
of indigestion does not justify the cost of an EKG.' If an EKG had
been properly administered, it would have revealed the patient was
experiencing sporadic arrhythmias, or irregular heart beats. Thus, the
administration of an EKG might have saved her life by alerting physicians that she was experiencing heart trouble.
Under current Texas law, the attending physician who made this
decision could be held liable for malpractice if a court determines he
exercised medical discretion rather than governmental discretion.2
However, proving primary negligence against the county hospital
would be problematic even if it was determined that the hospital had
inadequate facilities, failed to adopt or enforce rules, policies, and
procedures, failed to properly select and supervise staff, nurses, and
physicians, and retained incompetent professionals. Moreover, proving liability against the county hospital is virtually foreclosed unless it
1. The administration of an EKG is a standard procedure for most middle-aged
patients complaining of chest pains. See James L. Scott, Chest Pain, in 2 EMERGENCY
MEDICINE: CONCEPTS AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 1178, 1183 (Peter Rosen, M.D. et al.

eds., 3d ed. 1992); J. Stephen Stapczynski, Chest Pain, in EMERGENCY MEDICINE: A
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY GUIDE 127, 128 (Judith E. Tintinalli, M.D. et al. eds., 3d ed.

McGraw-HiU 1992).
2. Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 11 (Tex. 1994).
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can be shown the negligence resulted from use or misuse of tangible
property.3
This comment examines the Texas Tort Claims Act4 with particular
focus on the Act's tangible property exception and provides an overview of relevant case law.5 It specifically examines two recent Texas
Supreme Court decisions, University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. York 6 and Kassen v. Hatley,7 both rejecting negligence claims
against public hospitals. Last, this comment examines similar laws
from other states with a view toward reforming the Texas Tort Claims
Act.
I. THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS AcT
The Texas Tort Claims Act ("the Act") became effective January 1,
1970.8 In 1985, the Act was codified with no substantive changes. 9
As enacted, the Act waives sovereign immunity for governmental
units such as county hospitals where:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately
caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment, if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises
from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven
equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant
according to Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of
tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would,
were10it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas
law.

In other words, sovereign immunity is waived where government
owned vehicles are involved, where there is a premises defect, or
where injury is caused by "condition or use of tangible personal or
3. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-101.109 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1996); Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 7; University of Tex. Medical Branch at Galveston
v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994).
4. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§§ 101.001-101.109 (West 1986 & Supp.
1996).
5. Id. at § 101.021(2) (West 1986).
6. 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994).
7. 887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994).
8. Act of Jan. 1, 1970, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 292, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 874, repealed
by Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242,
3322 (codified as amended as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001101.109 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
9. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§§ 101.001-101.109 (West 1986 & Supp.
1996).
10. Id. § 101.021.
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real property."" To prove liability for medical malpractice against a
public hospital, a claimant must allege negligence involving the use or
misuse of tangible property.' 2 Consequently, to prove direct liability
of a governmental entity plaintiffs have alleged use, misuse, or nonuse
of tangible property such as medical records, 3 medications,' 4
5 hospital beds,' 6 and even the buildings
telephone equipment,
7
themselves.'
However, problems arise because the term tangible property is ambiguous, and moreover, the Texas Legislature has steadfastly refused18
to clarify its meaning despite repeated requests from the courts.
Consequently, the Texas Supreme Court and various appellate courts
have interpreted use of tangible personal property inconsistently over
the years following the vagaries of "political ideology rather than judicial reason."' 9 Therefore, today there is little rational basis for hearing claims of medical malpractice against public hospitals based on the
use of tangible property.
A. Early Texas Case Law Construing Use of Tangible Property
In 1974, the Texas Supreme Court considered the requirement for
pleading use of tangible property in Texas Department of Corrections
v. Herring.20 In Herring, the plaintiff alleged the Department of Corrections negligently failed "to provide adequate medical care and
treatment."' 2 1 Not surprisingly, the defendant argued failure to pro11. Id.; see Joe R. Greenhill & Thomas V. Murto III, Governmental Immunity, 49
TEX.

L.

REV.

462, 468 (1971); Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex.

1983).
12. Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at 31-33.
13. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Memorial Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 45 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Montoya v. John Peter Smith Hosp., 760
S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at
32.
14. See, e.g., Quinn v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 764 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); Floyd v. Willacy County Hosp. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 731,

732-33 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kassen v. Hatley, 887
S.W.2d 4, 13-14 (Tex. 1994).

15. Lowe v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 809 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
16. Overton Memorial Hosp.v. McGuire, 518 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1975).
17. Vela v. City of McAllen, 894 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi

1995, n.w.h.).
18. See, e.g., Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex.

1989); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 303 (Tex. 1976) (Greenhill, C.J.,
concurring). The definitions section of the Texas Tort Claims Act was last amended in
1987 when it defined such terms as governmental unit and volunteer fire department.
Use of tangible property remains undefined. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.001 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
19. Jordan M. Parker & Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Use and Non-Use of Tangible
PersonalProperty in Public Hospitals Under Section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims

Act, 24

TEX. TECH

L.

REV.

131, 132 (1993).

20. 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. 1974).

21. Id. at 9 (Johnson, J.).
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vide medical care and treatment did not involve use of tangible property.2 2 The trial court rendered a take-nothing summary judgment
with prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed.23 The Texas Supreme
Court agreed the plaintiff failed to state a claim against a governmental unit, but remanded the case for the plaintiff to amend its pleadings
because summary judgment was entered before the defendant filed a
special exception.24
In Overton Memorial Hospital v. McGuire,25 the plaintiff was injured in a fall from a public hospital bed with no rails. The plaintiff
alleged the hospital staff was negligent in providing him a bed with no
side rails.26 The hospital raised governmental immunity as a defense,
and the trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital.27 The
plaintiff appealed, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act waived such immunity.28 The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to determine whether the hospital had a duty to install bed rails absent a
physician's instructions. 29 The appellate court expressed doubt regarding whether the hospital had a duty to provide beds with side rails
which would preclude application of Texas Tort Claims Act.30 The
hospital petitioned for a writ of error.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed the hospital should not have been
granted summary judgment, and held the Texas Tort Claims Act was
indeed applicable under the circumstances of the case. The court
stated, "We believe that injuries proximately caused by negligently
providing a bed without bed rails are proximately caused from some
condition or some use of tangible property under circumstances where
a private person would be liable."' 31 Thus, under McGuire, failing to
provide bed rails is within the exception to the governmental immunity rule and precludes a hospital from claiming such a defense.32
Likewise, in Lowe v. Texas Tech University,3 3 the Texas Supreme
Court, following McGuire, held non-use of tangible property also falls
within the immunity exception. 34 In Lowe, the plaintiff sued for injuries sustained while, playing football. The plaintiff alleged the school
coaching staff failed to provide adequate braces and support devices
and refused to permit him to wear a knee brace, resulting in perma22. Id.

23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 9-10.
25. 518 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1975).

26. Id. at 528.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 529.
30. Id.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976).
34. Id. at 300 (citing McGuire v. Overton Memorial Hosp., 514 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Tyler 1974), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 518 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1975)).
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nent injury.3 5 The trial court held the plaintiff did not allege a negligent act by the defendant that invoked the waiver of governmental
immunity provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act.36 Therefore, the
defendant was immune from suit and entitled to summary judgment.37
The appellate court affirmed.38
The Texas Supreme Court, however, held the braces and support
devices were key elements of a complete uniform, thus concluding furnishing an incomplete uniform was tantamount to furnishing defective
and inadequate equipment. 39 Therefore, under Lowe, non-use of a
knee brace constitutes
use of property within the meaning of the Texas
40
Tort Claims Act.
Similarly, in Mokry v. University of Texas Health Science Center,4 '
the Dallas Court of Appeals held a plaintiff properly pled adequate
use of tangible property. InMokry, the plaintiff's eye was removed
and given to the defendant for pathological examination.4 2 Thereafter, the defendant's employee, while cleansing the eye, negligently
permitted the eye to drop out of its container and wash down the
drain.43 Both parties stipulated the drainpipes, sink, and drain were
fixtures and part of state-owned real or personal property,44 however,
the defendant filed a plea in abatement and special exceptions asserting the plaintiff failed to allege acts by the defendant that waived governmental immunity.45 The trial court sustained defendant's plea in
abatement and special exceptions and dismissed the case when the
plaintiff refused to amend his pleadings.' On appeal, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held the allegations of damages and use of tangible
property were adequate to meet the immunity exception under the
Texas Tort Claims Act.4 7
Conversely, in Beggs v. Texas Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation," the San Antonio Court of Appeals held damages arising from negligently transferring a violent patient to a private
nursing home did not fall within the immunity exception.49 In Beggs,
the San Antonio court defined use as "to put or bring into action or
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 298.
Idi
Id
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id
529 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id at 803.
Id
Id at 804.
Id at 803.
Id
Id at 804.
496 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd).
Id at 254.
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service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose"5 ° in asserting the
transfer was an error of judgment that could not "reasonably be said
to involve the negligent use of tangible property.'
In 1983, in Salcedo v. El Paso HospitalDistrict,52 the Texas Supreme
Court again considered the meaning of use of tangible property. In
Salcedo, the plaintiff sued for wrongful death of her spouse. The
Salcedo court, relying on the definition of use in Beggs, unanimously
held improper reading and interpretation of EKG graphs are use
within the meaning of the Texas Tort Claims Act.53 In so holding, the
Court reasoned the EKG machine was tangible property and the
reading and interpretation of its graphic information was the purpose
of its use.54 The Salcedo court found significant reassurance in the
Texas Legislature's failure to provide clarification in the seven years
since its Lowe decision, 5 thus implying tacit approval of the court's
liberal construction of the Texas Tort Claims Act.
Likewise, in 1989, the Texas Supreme Court, relying on Lowe, held
failure to provide a life preserver is use or misuse of equipment within
the meaning of the Texas Tort Claims Act. In Robinson v. Central
Texas Mental Health Mental Retardation Center,56 a mental patient,
with a history of epileptic seizures drowned after the defendant failed
to provide a life preserver. 57 The Robinson court deemed life preservers as part of proper swimming attire concluding the defendant's provision of incomplete swimming attire was misuse of equipment.58
Effectively, therefore, non-use was held to be within the scope of misuse of tangible property.5 9
Justice Spears, in his concurrence, maintained the Texas Legislature
has "long since acquiesced" to the court's usurpation of the legislature's role in providing meaning to this ambiguous statute. 60 Nevertheless, three justices strongly dissented, describing the majority's
reasoning as elliptical. 61 The dissent reasoned that equating non-use
with use effectively waives governmental immunity in all cases, as
each instance logically must involve either use or non-use of tangible
property. Furthermore, they argued the majority was rewriting the
statute.62
50. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH
1962)).
51. Id. at 254.
52. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id. at 32-33.
55. Id. at 32.
56. 780 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1989).
57. Id. at 169.

CENTURY DICTIONARY

2012 (2d ed.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 171.

60. Id. at 172 (Spears, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 174 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 175 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
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In 1992, in Texas Departmentof Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty,63 the Texas Supreme Court held misuse of records also
falls within the scope of governmental immunity.' In Petty, various
physicians confined the plaintiff to mental health facilities for fifty-one
years based on inaccurate diagnostic findings of hebephrenia, schizophrenia, mental illness, no mental illness, mild mental retardation,
moderate mental retardation, and no mental retardation. 65 Throughout her confinement, the plaintiff's treatment consisted of only custodial care. 66 However, she was neither mentally ill nor mentally
retarded. As a result, she sued the defendant for negligence, alleging
use or misuse of records and the information contained therein. 67
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, albeit reducing the
jury's $505,000 damage award to $250,000.68 The jury "explicitly
found that Ms. Petty was injured by negligence in the use or misuse of
property. ' 69 The appellate court affirmed, and in a plurality decision,
the Texas Supreme Court, relying on Salcedo, held misuse of records
and information were within the scope of the governmental immunity
waiver.7 0 Notably, four justices dissented in Petty.7 Justice Cornyn,
writing for the dissent, agreed there was little to distinguish Salcedo
from the case at hand. However, he asserted the Salcedo majority had
"blurred the distinction between "tangible property [that is itself] the
instrument of harm and property such as writings or records, which
are part of a setting in which harm occurs and which merely memorialize information and ideas."7 2 Thus, Justice Cornyn found considerable difficulty in determining a written record to be tangible property.7 3
B.

Information from Records Is Not Tangible
Approximately one year after Petty, the Texas Supreme Court reversed its position on use of records and information in University of
Texas Medical Branch v. York, 74 holding "information ... does not
constitute tangible personal property under [the Act] and.., the State
has not waived governmental immunity for negligence involving the
use, misuse, or nonuse of information in a patient's medical
records."7 5 In York, the plaintiffs' minor son was permanently injured
in an auto accident. After improving his condition through outpatient
63. 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992) (plurality decision).
64. Id. at 681.
65. Id.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id
Id. at 681.
Id at 682.
Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 685-89 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 688 (Comyn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 688-89 (Comyn, J., dissenting).

74. 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994).

75. Id. at 179.
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treatment, the son was admitted to the hospital for a special inpatient
therapy program,76 where he broke his hip. However, the hospital did
not diagnose his broken hip until eight days later.77
The plaintiffs asserted the hospital failed to record in the patient's
file the events that occurred on the day the patient broke his hip, as
well as observations his parents made during the period before the
injury was discovered. 8 The plaintiffs further claimed the hospital
failed to follow a recorded recommendation to x-ray the patient's hip
and contended governmental immunity was waived because of misuse
of the patient's records and the information contained therein. 79 Not
surprisingly, the hospital raised the governmental immunity defense.80
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on a jury verdict
and the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed. 8 1 The defendant filed a
petition for writ of error with the Texas Supreme Court, which in turn,
agreed with the hospital that governmental immunity was not waived
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 2 Justice Enoch, writing for the majority, was joined by five other justices.83 Justice Gammage wrote for
the dissent, joined by Justices Doggett and Spector.'
The majority opinion quickly dispensed with Petty as a mere plurality opinion with little precedential value and incoherent reasoning.8 5
Further, the court distinguished Salcedo, asserting it was the misuse of
the EKG equipment itself, rather than the reading and interpreting of
the graphs, which complied with the necessary element of use of tangible property.86
In his majority opinion, Justice Enoch reasoned that the Texas Legislature must use "clear and unambiguous language" in its statutes if it
intends to waive sovereign immunity. 87 Furthermore, the majority
placed considerable reliance on the fact that, prior to codification, the
statute itself provided it should "be liberally construed to achieve the
purposes hereof."8 " However, when the Texas Tort Claims Act was
76. Id. at 176.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 175.
84. Id. at 179 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
85. York, 871 S.W.2d at 176.
86. Id. at 178. Interestingly, the Salcedo court concluded its opinion by unequivocally stating, "Reading and interpreting are purposes for which an electrocardiogram
graph is used or employed in diagnosing myocardial infarction. We hold, therefore,
that Mrs. Salcedo has alleged her loss was proximately caused by the negligence of the
hospital district's employees in the use of tangible property." Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at
33.
87. York, 871 S.W.2d at 177.
88. Id. at 177 n.3 (quoting TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 § 13 (West

1970) (repealed 1985)).
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codified, this language was altered to render the Act subject to
the Code Construction Act's general principles of statutory
construction.89
Justice Enoch reasoned that although record paper is tangible, the
information recorded is "an abstract concept, lacking corporeal, physical, or palpable qualities."90 Thus, he concluded, information contained in records does not meet the Texas Tort Clams Act's
requirement of use of tangible property because it effectively eliminates the tangible property requirement. 91 Justice Enoch stated:
We hold that information, which may or may not be recorded in a
patient's medical records, does not constitute tangible property
under ...

the Texas Tort Claims Act and that the State has not

waived governmental immunity for negligence involving the use,
92
misuse, or nonuse of information in a patient's medical records.
Predictably, the dissenting opinion differed, asserting that the majority had distorted the court's earlier opinions. 93 Moreover, Justice
Gammage maintained that the majority failed to effectively distinguish Salcedo, and thus should have overruled it.94 The dissent placed
considerable reliance on the Texas Legislature's failure to modify the
Texas Tort Claims Act since Lowe, Salcedo, Robinson, and Petty.95
The dissent reasonably asserted a file is tangible property and may be
held in one's hand and used. Further, Justice Gammage accused the
majority of resorting to "legal fiction," stating:
The majority modifies [the Act] to say that a file and its contents
cannot be held in your hand. The majority works this smoke-andmirrors sleight-of-hand by rationalizing it is not the physical file that
counts, but the "mental" informational content, which it concludes
is not "tangible." To say that the utility of that file is not the substantive object of the statute is absurd. One might as well say the
proper utility of a wrench, vehicle, or other machine or material
item is not the real object of the statute. The worker who makes the
"mental error" of loosening the wrong bolt with his wrench, causing
an accident, makes no more or less use of the tangible property than
89. York, 871 S.W.2d at 177 n.3. The Code Construction Act requires a court to

consider statutory purposes as well as former statutory provisions and legislative history. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.§ 311.023 (West 1988).
90. York, 871 S.W.2d at 179.
91. Id.
92. Id
93. Id. at 179-80 (Gammage, J., dissenting) (construing Texas Dep't of MHMR v.
Petty, 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992); Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d

169 (Tex. 1989); and Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976)).

94. Id. at 180 (Gammage, J., dissenting) (discussing Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp.
Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983)).
95. Id. (Gammage, J., dissenting) (referring to Texas Dep't of MHMR v. Petty,

848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992); Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169

(Tex. 1989); Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983); Lowe v. Texas

Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976)).
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the physicians and health care professionals did here. It is the
proper use, or misuse, of items that is addressed in specific terms in
the statute, and no amount of legal sophistry or disingenuous intellectual gymnastics can change that.96
The dissent further asserted that Robinson and Lowe were sufficient to waive governmental immunity under these circumstances and
analyzed the court's non-use decisions. 97 Justice Gammage concluded
that the majority adopted an approach previously rejected by the
court, and assumed an interpretation of the Texas Tort Claims Act
which the Texas Legislature never implied. He stated, "This court will
henceforth inflict injustice on the citizens of our state meant to be
protected by the Tort Claims Act, without regard to the established
purpose and meaning of [the Act]."9 "
C. Non-use Is Not Within the Meaning of Use
Five years after Robinson, in Kassen v. Hatley,99 the Texas Supreme
Court held non-use may no longer be construed as use. 100 In Kassen,
the plaintiffs sued Parkland Memorial Hospital, the University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, a doctor, and a nurse
for the wrongful death of their twenty-four year old daughter who had
a history of chronic mental problems.'' The daughter had been
brought to the Parkland emergency room by a policeman who had
found her wandering near an expressway. 02 However, the hospital
had a difficult patient file on the daughter instructing the staff not to
admit her, but rather to refer her to the county mental health and
mental retardation system. 0 3 Upon her arrival, the daughter revealed
she was in possession of prescribed medication and had taken excessive doses. The doctor and nurse confiscated the remaining medication. The daughter demanded the medication back and threatened
suicide if the doctor and nurse did not return it.' °4 The doctor and
nurse refused and instead offered her a cab ride home. The daughter
then stated she did not want to go home and voluntarily left the hospital without her medication. 0 5 Shortly thereafter, she committed suicide by "stepping into" freeway traffic.' 0 6 Consequently, the plaintiffs
sued for negligence, relying on the condition or use of the difficult
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. (Ganmage, J., dissenting).
Id. at 181-82 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
Id. at 182 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 7.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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room
patient file, their daughter's medical records, the 0emergency
7
medication.1
confiscated
the
and
manual
procedures
The trial court granted summary judgment for the doctor and
Southwestern Medical Center.0 8 However, the case went to trial
against the hospital and nurse, and the court granted a directed verdict for the defendants. 0 9 The plaintiffs appealed." 0 On appeal, the
Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, and the defendants
fied a petition for writ of error."'
Justice Gonzales delivered the majority opinion, joined by four justices." 2 Chief Justice Phillips concurred and dissented in part, noting
problems with the reasoning and the judgment." 3 Likewise, Justice
Gammage, joined by Justice Doggett, concurred in part and dissented
in part." 4 Justice Enoch did not sit." 5
The case presented two questions. The first was whether medical
professionals who are sued individually may raise an official immunity
defense based on the exercise of medical discretion rather than governmental discretion."16 This issue was remanded" 7 and is outside the
scope of this comment. The second issue was whether the daughter's
suicide was caused by a condition or use of tangible personalproperty,
thus waiving the hospital's immunity." 8
In his majority opinion, Justice Gonzales quickly dispensed with the
difficult patient file, the procedures manual, and the decedent's medical records relying on the court's recent decision in York." 9 The majority reasoned that failure to return the medication was non-use of
property rather than use and proclaimed this court has "never held
that a non-use of property [could] support a claim under the Texas
20
Consequently, the court reversed as to the hospiTort Claims Act.'
2'
tal's liability.'
However, Chief Justice Phillips disagreed with the majority regarding the hospitals. 2 2 Phillips contended a prescription drug was tangible property with its utility in the "physical properties of the drug
107. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id. at 7-8.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. See Hatley v. Kassen, 859 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part,887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994).
112. Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 6.
113. Id. at 14-15 (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 9.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 13.
119. Id at 14.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 15 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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itself."' 2 3 He argued the plaintiffs adequately pled use of property
while agreeing that non-use would not state a claim. 24 Phillips argued
because the plaintiffs had demonstrated the defendant confiscated a
drug rather than failed to provide one, the plaintiffs stated a claim of
use. He concluded, "If defendants had really 'not used' the medication, it would have remained in Johnson's possession, not theirs,"
therefore the plaintiffs adequately alleged use of tangible property.25
Likewise, Justice Gammage, joined by Justice Doggett, did not
agree with the majority's analysis of use of tangible property or the
resulting judgment for the hospital. 126 Further, Gammage did not
agree with the standard adopted for official immunity. Justice Gammage concurred with Chief Justice Phillips' opinion that confiscating
the medication constituted a use of property, stating, "I am incredulous that the majority call it a 'non-use' of tangible physical property
to confiscate medication prescribed by other physicians from the
and then knowingly and conowner for whom it was prescribed,
27
sciously withhold it from her."'
Further, Justice Gammage stated although the court was bound by
York, the medical records and the difficult patient file should, in fact,
state an action for misuse of tangible property. 128 Additionally, he
argued non-use does not always fail to state a claim under the Texas
Tort Claims Act. Justice Gammage maintained that "non-use of some
the use of property supplied
item of property necessary to make1' safe
29
has properly been held actionable.'
As a result of York, Texas courts may no longer construe failure to
use property as use of property under the Texas Tort Claims Act regardless of the harm. Furthermore, plaintiffs may no longer allege
misuse of records and information to meet the necessary element of
use of tangibleproperty. Perhaps it is time for the Texas Legislature to
enact a more reasonable statute.
II. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to find a reason to limit recovery against public hospitals based upon use of tangible property. Moreover, public hospitals
may now be held liable for medical malpractice in some instances
while no liability arises in others. In short, if a public hospital fails to
order an EKG which a reasonable medical professional should have
ordered, or if it orders an EKG and misreads the results, the hospital
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. Id. at 15-16 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 15.
128. Id. at 15-16 (Gammage, J., dissenting) (citing University of Tex. Medical
Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 181-82 (Tex. 1994)).

129. Id. at 16 (Gamnmage, J., dissenting).
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probably will not be held liable. However, if a public hospital orders
an EKG and negligently uses the equipment, it probably will be held
liable. This results in an irrational and unfair case-by-case
adjudication.
Presently, public hospitals are rarely held liable for malpractice,
thus leaving hospitals with little incentive to improve quality of service. Further, indigents, compelled to depend upon public hospitals,
are the principle victims of the Texas Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the Texas Tort Claims Act, resulting in an increased burden on society in general.
A. Is the Texas Supreme Court Legislating?
With these recent decisions, the Texas Supreme Court could be accused of usurping legislative power. Yet, based on the Texas Legislature's refusal to clarify the Texas Tort Claims Act, varying
interpretations are not surprising. However, the Texas Supreme
Court's present position largely frustrates the purpose of the statute.
The citizens of Texas cannot be expected to rely on the holdings of
the Texas Supreme Court if important legal conclusions change with
every election. Furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis should better withstand ever-changing political ideologies. 3 ' Indeed, existing
law creates expectations. While Blackstone's declaratory theory
states that courts do not create law, but merely find and declare existing law,' 3 ' today that theory scarcely reflects reality. Further, there
is considerable cost in dispensing with this myth.' 32 As Professor
Mishkin asserts:
[There] is [a] strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges are
bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law
impersonally as well as impartially, that they exercise no individual
choice and have no program of their own to advance. It is easy
enough for the sophisticated to show elements of naivet6 in this
view - and no more difficult to scoff at symbols generally. But the
fact remains that ... this symbolic view of courts is a major factor in
securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions. If the
view be in part myth, it is myth by which we live and which can be
sacrificed only at substantial cost .... 133
Therefore, when a court ignores existing precedent, it undermines the
stability of our judicial system. Moreover, when a court repeatedly
chooses to ignore established precedent and changes existing law, with
130. Stare decisis et non quieta movere has been interpreted as "to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established." Sattiewhite v. State, 600
S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
131. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 69.
132. Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, Foreward: The High Court,
the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 59-60
(1965).

133. Id at 62-63.
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neither good cause nor acknowledgment that its prior holding was
wrong, the result is an unstable, unreliable, and consequently, disrespected judicial system. Concededly, automatic application of stare
decisis prevents judicial change and prevents proper evolution of the
when there is
law. However, courts should undertake such deviation
134
cause, and changes are reasoned and moderate.
Justice Jackson asserts, "Unless the assumption is substantially true
that cases will be disposed of by application of known principles and
previously disclosed courses of reasoning, our common-law process
would become the most intolerable kind of ex post facto judicial lawmaking.' 1 35 For Justice Jackson, the choice was simple: "Either
judges must be fettered to mere application of a legislative code with a
minimum of discretion, ... or they must formulate and adhere to
some voluntary principles that will impart stability and predictability
to judicial discretion.' 1 36 Yet, the Texas Supreme Court, in holding
records are not tangible property, 137 deviated from well-established
precedent with neither reason nor moderation. Further, the mere fact
the Texas Legislature failed to act in the face of the Texas Supreme
Court's many requests for clarification13 8 carries much weight for the
the court's earlier inargument that the Legislature was content with
1 39
terpretations of the Texas Tort Claims Act.
B. The Texas Tort Claims Act Compared to Statutes from
Other Jurisdictions
Missouri and North Dakota are the only jurisdictions besides Texas
where liability of governmental units is dependent upon "use of tangible property."' 4 ° However, North Dakota holds a governmental unit
liable for wrongful acts or omissions by its employees acting within the
scope of their employment where the employees would be personally
134. Robert H. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334, 334
(1944).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of MHMR v. Petty, 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992) (plurality
opinion) (patient's treatment records used and relied upon are tangible property);
Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983) (reading and interpreting
of an EKG graph was held use of tangible property).
138. See, e.g., Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex.
1989); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 303 (Tex. 1976) (Greenhill, C.J.,

concurring).

139. See University of Tex. Medical Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tex.
dissenting) (citing Texas Dep't of MHMR v. Petty, 848 S.W.2d
1994) (Gammage, J.,
680, 683-84 (Tex. 1992) (plurality opinion)); see also Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR
Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169,172 (Tex. 1989) (Spears, J., concurring); Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp.
Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1983); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 303

(Tex. 1976).

140. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.600.1(2) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT.
§ 32-12.1-03(1) (Michie Supp. 1995).

CODE
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liable to a plaintiff.' 4 ' This largely obviates the effects Texans suffer.
To waive sovereign immunity in Missouri, a plaintiff must show: 1) the
property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; 2) the
injury was directly caused by the condition; 3) injury was reasonably
foreseeable; and 4) a public employee created the condition in4 2 the
scope of employment or the entity had notice of the condition.'
Most other states approach the sovereign immunity exception differently than Texas. For example, many states hold public hospitals
liable for negligence to the same extent as individuals,' 43 while others
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03 (Michie Supp. 1995).
142. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.600.1(2) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1996).
143. In Alabama, a board of adjustment hears and considers claims for the state
based on negligence law. ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-60 to -74 (1991 & Supp. 1995). The
board is directed to use "as its guide, when applicable, the ordinary rules of negligence and worker's compensation laid down by the courts and the moral obligation of
the State of Alabama .

. . ." ALA. CODE

§ 41-9-68(a) (Supp. 1995). Governmental

entities in Alabama are liable if a private person would be liable. ALA. CODE § 1193-1(5) (1994). Arizona has reserved absolute and qualified immunity only in specific
listed circumstances, and negligence of a public hospital is not one of the listed circumstances. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820.01-820.22 (1992 and Supp. 1995). Colorado waives sovereign immunity for actions resulting in injuries from the operation
of any public hospital. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(b) (1988). Connecticut has a
claims commissioner that hears claims against the state. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-142
(1995).
(a) When the claims commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may
authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents
an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could
be liable.
(b) ... The state waives its immunity from liability and from suit in each
such action and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary
or governmental nature of the activity complained of.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-160 (1995). Hawaii waives immunity for tort liability, specifying the state may be held liable in the same manner "as a private individual under like
circumstances." HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662-2 (Michie 1995). The statute then excepts from this waiver claims involving actions by state employees "based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty ... whether or not the discretion involved has been abused." HAw. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 662-15 (Michie 1995). The Idaho statute waives sovereign immunity for
negligence where "a private person or entity would be liable." IDAHO CODE § 6903(a) (1990). However, the numerous exceptions to this waiver include language
closely duplicating the Hawaii exception quoted above. But, the Idaho exceptions do
not apply if the action in question was committed with malice or criminal intent.
IDAHO CODE § 6-904 (1990). Illinois has a court of claims authorized to hear tort
claims against the State "if a like cause of action would lie against a private person or
corporation in a civil suit, and all like claims... against the Medical Center Commission.. .." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705 para. 505/8(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996). In Iowa,
waiver of sovereign immunity and the exceptions to waiver are similar to Hawaii and
Idaho. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 669.4, 669.14 (West Supp. 1995). The Louisiana Constitution provides neither the state nor a subdivision is immune from suit and liability
for injury. However, the legislature is permitted to limit or prescribe the extent of
liability. LA. CoNsT. art. 12, § 10 (amended 1995). The legislature has now enacted
laws to limit damages. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106 (West Supp. 1996). Massachusetts' statute is similar in substance to Hawaii's. Public employers are liable for injury
caused by the negligence of public employees acting within the scope of employment.
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258 § 2, 10 (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 1995). Michigan pre-
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hold hospitals liable only to the extent they are insured.'" Further,
several states expressly preserve immunity where injuries result from

serves governmental immunity if certain conditions are met. However, there is a specilic clause in the statute stating, "This act does not grant immunity to a governmental
agency with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical
care facility or to the agents or employees of such.. . ." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 691.1407 (West 1987). Montana holds governmental entities and employees liable
for their torts regardless of whether their duty was proprietary or governmental making certain exceptions for judicial and legislative acts and acts of elected officials.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-102-114 (1995). New Hampshire preserves sovereign immunity for "discretionary executive or planning function[s] or dut[ies] on the part of
the state or any state agency or a state officer, employee, or official acting within the

scope of his office or employment." N.H.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 541-B:19(c) (Supp.

1995) However, it specifically excepts from this claims arising from the clinical operation and administration of the New Hampshire hospital. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541B:21 (Supp. 1995) Likewise, New Mexico, while dispensing with the distinction of
discretionary acts, excepts from immunity "the operation of any hospital, infirmary,
mental institution, clinic, dispensary, medical care home or like facilities." N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-2, -4, -9, -10 (Michie 1995). North Carolina has an "Industrial
Commission" which acts as a board of claims. The commission hears and determines
all claims arising from the negligence of the state's departments, agencies and employees. There appears to be no exceptions affecting public hospitals. If a governmental
unit is authorized to purchase insurance, and does so, it effectively waives the commission's jurisdiction over the matter. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291-143-300.1 (1993 &
Supp. 1995). North Dakota permits liability of the governmental unit for wrongful
acts or omissions by employees acting within the scope of their employment where
the employee would be personally liable to the plaintiff. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.103 (Supp. 1995). Ohio specifically waives the immunity of hospitals owned or operated by political subdivisions and provides for them to be sued in the court of common pleas rather than in its court of claims. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(B)
(Anderson Supp. 1995). Pennsylvania expressly preserves sovereign immunity. 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2310 (1995). However, the state then waives it in a laundry list of
circumstances which include "[a]cts of health care employees of Commonwealth
agency medical facilities or institutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor,
dentist, nurse or related health care personnel." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522 (1995).
Rhode Island waives immunity and is liable for tort actions subject only to the limitation of the damages cap. R.I. GEN. LAWS 88 9-31-1, 9-31-2 (1985). Virginia statute
provides the "Commonwealth shall be liable" for torts as a private person would be
and includes a brief laundry list of exclusions, none of which appears to apply to
public hospitals. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Michie Supp. 1995). Washington
states it will be liable for tort damages as if it were a private person and makes no
exceptions. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996). Wisconsin permits a plaintiff to bring most tort claims against governmental bodies with few
exclusions, none of which appears to be a public hospital. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80
(West 1983 & Supp. 1995). Wyoming expressly excepts medical facilities from sovereign immunity. "A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from... injury
... caused by the negligence of health care providers who are employees of the governmental entity... while acting within the scope of their duties." WYo. STAT. § 139-110 (Supp. 1995).
144. In Arkansas, a state claims commission determines whether a claim has merit.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-202 (Michie 1996). All political subdivisions are "immune
from liability and from suit for damages, except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance." ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (Michie 1996). The Maryland Tort Claims Act, likewise, waives immunity to the extent of insurance coverage.
MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV'T § 12-104 (1996).
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performance of authorized discretionary duty. 145 While there has
145. A tort claim may not be brought against Alaska if based on the "exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a state agency or an employee of the state, whether or not the discretion
involved is abused." ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1994). A public entity in California
is liable for employee's torts if the employee would be liable. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 815.2 (West 1995). Additionally, as in Alaska, a public employee is not liable for an
injury if the act or omission results from an exercise of discretion vested in him regardless of whether the discretion was abused. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West
1995). Likewise, a Delaware governmental entity is not liable for damage resulting
from the "performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4011 (Supp. 1994). The District of Columbia statute
waives governmental immunity only for negligence resulting from the operation of a
vehicle in the scope of employment and provides for indemnification of medical employees in such instances. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1212, -1215 (1992). Common law
holds the district immune only where the act resulting in injury was in the exercise of
a discretionary function; immunity is waived where the act was ministerial. See, e.g.,
Durso v. Taylor, 624 A.2d 449, 458-59 (D.C. 1993). The Georgia State Tort Claims
Act is fairly new and applicable only to state, not local, governmental entities. GA.
CODE ANN. § 50-21-22 (1994). There is no liability resulting from "[tihe exercise or
performance of or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is
abused." GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-24 (1994). Local governmental immunity is controlled by statutes, case law, and the state constitution. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405, 406 (1993).
There appears to be much confusion regarding whether local entities may waive sovereign immunity by acquiring insurance. Regardless, recent Georgia case law holds
sovereign immunity does not extend to hospital authorities. Thomas v. Hosp. Auth.,
440 S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1994). The Indiana statute provides for no liability where a governmental entity or employee acting within the scope of employment causes a loss
from "the performance of a discretionary function." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3
(Burns Supp. 1995). The Kansas Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity if a
private person would be liable. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6103 (1989). It then presents a
laundry list of numerous exceptions to the waiver including claims based on the performance of discretionary duties on the part of the entity or an employee "regardless
of the level of discretion involved." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (Supp. 1995). Kentucky has a Board of Claims with jurisdiction over all negligence claims against the
Commonwealth. The Board's enabling statute preserves sovereign immunity for
"[d]iscretionary acts or decisions." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.073 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1993). The Maine Tort Claims Act expressly preserves immunity from tort
claims for all governmental entities. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (West 1980).

It then lists certain exceptions, none of which include claims against public hospitals.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104-A (West Supp. 1995). Minnesota proclaims the
state will pay compensation for injuries where the state, if a private person, would be
liable, but excludes from liability losses caused by performing or failing to perform a
discretionary act and losses experienced while under usual care and treatment at a
state hospital "where reasonable use of available appropriations has been made to
provide care." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West Supp. 1996). Nebraska has two tort

claims acts, one for state entities and one for political subdivisions. Although the acts
are substantially the same, claims against the state must first be reviewed by a state
claims board. Nebraska preserves immunity; then states the governmental entity
would be liable to the same extent as a private individual; and then excepts from
liability claims based on discretionary duties of governmental employees. NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-902, 908, 910 (1991 & Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209, -8,213, -

8,215, -8,219 (1994). Nevada waives its immunity from liability but subsequently excludes from the waiver actions against employees or political subdivisions based on
discretionary functions. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.031, 41.032 (Michie 1996). New
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been litigation concerning whether a task is discretionary or ministerial, medical malpractice, by its nature, often arises from the performance of authorized discretionary duties. Thus, these approaches
preclude the use of tangible property construction problems seen in
Texas.
C. The Texas Legislature Should Amend the Texas Tort Claims Act
It seems irrational to tie claims of negligence to use of tangible
property. Either a governmental entity is negligent or it is not. It is
senseless to determine whether a victim recovers based on a governmental entity's use of tangible property. Alternatively, the Texas Legislature might consider drafting a tort claims act that permits
governmental liability only to the extent the governmental entity is
insured, as in Arkansas and Maryland.' 46 However, this may be contrary to the public's best interest. For example, individuals injured by
Jersey has separate statutes for entities and employees, although substantially the
same. The state and other public entities are liable for torts to the same extent as a
private individuals, but are not liable for injuries resulting from discretionary acts and
duties. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:2-2-3 (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:3-1-2 (West
1992 & Supp. 1995). New York has a court of claims to hear and determine claims
against the state. Its Court of Claims Act expressly waives immunity and consents to
suit against the state as an individual, and there is no express exception for discretionary acts. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 8-9 (Consol. 1989 & Supp. 1996). However, New York
case law holds there is immunity for injurious consequences of official acts involving
the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 531 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1988), aff'd, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). Oklahoma's tort claims act
specifically defines municipal and county hospitals as political subdivisions. The act
declares and then waives sovereign immunity, stating the political subdivision shall be
liable as a private person or entity. OKLA. STAT.. ANN tit. 51, §§ 152, 152.1, 153 (West
1988 & Supp. 1996). It then provides a laundry list of thirty-one exceptions from
liability including "[plerformance of or the failure to exercise or perform any act or
service which is in the discretion of the state or political subdivision or its employees."
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155 (West Supp. 1996). Oregon also preserves immunity
regarding claims based on discretionary functions or duties. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265
(Supp. 1994). South Carolina waives sovereign immunity except in "the exercise of
discretion or judgment." S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-40, -60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Tennessee preserves immunity for all governmental entities; denies that immunity for
negligence; then excludes discretionary functions from the denial. TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-20-201, -205 (1980 & Supp. 1995). Utah preserves immunity for governmental
entities, specifically for government-owned hospitals and health-care facilities. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1993). A subsequent code section waives immunity for negligence caused by employees but excepts discretionary functions from waiver. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-30, -10 (Supp. 1995). Vermont waives sovereign immunity declaring
itself liable for injuries as a private person would be and then excludes claims based
on "the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state agency or an employee of the state . . . ." VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (Supp. 1995). The West Virginia Constitution does not permit the
state to be a defendant "in any court of law or equity." W. VA. CONST., art. IV, § 35.
Thus, West Virginia created a court of claims to consider such claims. W. VA. CODE
§§ 14-2-4, 14-2-12 (1995). The West Virginia tort claims act expressly excludes applicability to hospitals of a political subdivision. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3 (1992).
146. ARK. CODE ANN. 21-9-301 (Michie 1996); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T
§ 12-104 (1995).
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governmental entities with insurance might recover significantly more
than those with similar claims against underinsured or uninsured entities. On the other hand, governmental entities might be tempted to
opt for no insurance resulting in significant cost-savings to the public
no premiums, no liability - but no recompense for victims.
The best option is to refuse to waive governmental immunity where
discretionary acts of governmental units are involved, or in the alternative, minimally waive governmental immunity where a private
individual or corporation would be held liable under similar circumstances. Determining which acts are discretionary and which are ministerial would remain difficult and fact intensive, but this proposal
would preclude most problems in medical malpractice cases which by
their nature arise from performance of discretionary duties.
Ideally, the new statute should be constructed like Hawaii and
Washington statutes,147 which waive tort immunity with little or no
exceptions. This would end the need for case-by-case adjudications.
Governmental units would be held liable for their negligence in the
same manner as individuals or corporations. This would balance competing public interests. On one hand, actual damages could be capped
and exemplary damages precluded, thereby saving taxpayers money.
On the other hand, public hospitals would be held liable for malpractice. Waiver of sovereign immunity would no longer depend on
whether tangible property was involved, but rather on whether the
hospital committed medical malpractice.
If a public hospital commits medical malpractice, or if any governmental unit is negligent, injured victims should have recourse. Presently, public hospitals may avoid malpractice liability by not using
tangible property such as X-rays, CT-scans, or EKGs.
Most importantly, however, if there is no consequence for providing
poor care, selecting employees who perform poorly, or poor administrative practices, how can society expect the quality of care in public
hospitals to improve? Today, more and more victims are permanently
impaired and families left bereft. How can it be in Texas' best interest
not to provide recompense? Holding public hospitals liable would
provide the incentive to improve standards of care, administrative
practices, and employment policies.
CONCLUSION

It is time the Texas Legislature amended the Texas Tort Claims Act.
Whether a public hospital is liable for medical malpractice should not
depend on whether an injury is the result of use of tangible property.
147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (West Supp. 1996); HAW.
§ 662-2 (Michie 1995).
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Rather, liability should depend on whether or not the public hospital
was negligent.
Deborah Margaret Taylor
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